The A380 program — which consumed approximately 12 billion euros in development costs and was ultimately terminated after 251 aircraft deliveries — represents the most significant strategic miscalculation in Airbus's history. The program was premised on the continued dominance of the hub-and-spoke aviation model and growing demand for very large aircraft to connect major hubs. Instead, point-to-point long-haul routes enabled by fuel-efficient twin-engine widebodies like the A350 and Boeing 787 grew faster than hub connectivity, leaving the A380 without the market it was designed to serve. The decision to develop the A380 rather than a smaller, more fuel-efficient widebody earlier absorbed capital that delayed Airbus's widebody competitive response to the Boeing 787.

The decision to accept fixed-price contracts for the A400M military transport program — under pressure from government customers seeking budget certainty — exposed Airbus to cost overrun risk that has resulted in multi-billion euro charges over the program's development and production life. Military programs of this technical complexity consistently encounter development challenges and cost growth; accepting fixed-price terms transferred this risk entirely to Airbus. A risk-sharing contract structure with government customers would have produced significantly better financial outcomes for Airbus while delivering comparable cost certainty for governments through appropriate contingency provisions.

In January 2021, Airbus agreed to pay approximately 3.6 billion euros to resolve bribery and corruption investigations by French, UK, and US authorities related to the use of third-party intermediaries in aircraft sales across multiple markets. The settlement — the largest-ever resolution of a corruption case in France and among the largest globally — imposed significant financial penalties, damaged Airbus's reputation with government customers, and required extensive remediation programs across the company's commercial and compliance operations. The investigation revealed systematic failures in the company's export compliance and commercial intermediary management that had persisted for years.

Airbus's initial response to Boeing's 787 Dreamliner announcement was to propose an A330 derivative rather than a clean-sheet design, delaying by several years the A350 program that would ultimately become a competitive product. The A330-based A350 proposal was rejected by key airlines including Qantas, Lufthansa, and Emirates as insufficiently advanced relative to the 787's composite-intensive design. Airbus was forced to restart the A350 program as a clean-sheet design — the right decision ultimately — but the delay allowed the 787 to accumulate a significant order lead and establish strong operator relationships that the A350 has taken years to address.