The 2007 acquisition of Corus Steel for 12.1 billion USD — a price that required Tata to outbid Brazil's CSN in a competitive auction that drove the final price approximately 30% above initial estimates — proved strategically costly when the global financial crisis of 2008–09 collapsed steel prices, European demand, and Corus's profitability simultaneously. The acquisition debt burden, combined with the structural uncompetitiveness of European integrated steel production at post-crisis energy costs and carbon prices, has made Tata Steel Europe a persistent financial underperformer for over 15 years, consuming billions in capital support and management attention that could have been deployed in higher-returning portfolio businesses.

The Tata Nano, launched in 2009 as the world's cheapest car at a target price of 1 lakh rupees, was one of the most celebrated product launches in Indian industrial history — and one of its most instructive commercial failures. The positioning of the Nano as the cheapest car in the world, while generating global media attention, stigmatized the product among its target market of aspiring Indian consumers who did not want to be seen driving the cheapest option. The association of affordability with low social status, combined with safety concerns following reports of vehicle fires, product quality issues, and inadequate distribution, resulted in sales collapsing from initial targets of 250,000 vehicles annually to fewer than 10,000 by 2017. The Nano was discontinued in 2018, leaving the Sanand factory underutilized until its eventual repurposing for electric vehicle production.

The removal of Cyrus Mistry as Chairman of Tata Sons in October 2016, and the subsequent multi-year legal and public dispute over the circumstances and justification for his removal, exposed governance weaknesses in the group's complex multi-entity ownership structure and damaged India's perception of Tata as a corporate governance exemplar. The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in Tata's favor in 2021, but the four-year dispute distracted leadership, consumed legal resources, and created uncertainty among institutional investors about the governance standards applicable to Tata Sons as a privately held trust-controlled entity. The episode accelerated the development of clearer succession planning and board governance protocols within the group.

Tata's telecommunications joint venture with Japanese carrier NTT Docomo, entered in 2009 with Docomo acquiring a 26% stake in Tata Teleservices for approximately 2.7 billion USD, ended in a costly and reputation-damaging dispute when Docomo sought to exit the investment. An arbitration panel ruled that Tata had to pay Docomo approximately 1.17 billion USD under the terms of the exit clause — a payment that the Reserve Bank of India initially blocked on foreign exchange regulations grounds before the courts directed compliance. The episode highlighted the regulatory complexity of unwinding international joint ventures in India and the reputational cost of commercial disputes that reach international arbitration.