Fisker Inc.'s business model was built on the premise that the most capital-intensive and operationally complex element of automotive manufacturing — the factory — could be separated from the design, brand, and customer relationship functions that a startup could actually build competitively. This asset-light model had theoretical elegance: by contracting vehicle production to Magna Steyr rather than building its own manufacturing facility, Fisker avoided the multi-billion-dollar capital expenditure that Tesla, Rivian, and Lucid each committed to their own production infrastructure. The capital saved could instead be deployed toward product design, software development, and brand building — the elements of the automotive business where Fisker genuinely had competitive capabilities. The revenue model was straightforward: Fisker would design vehicles, manage the customer relationship, handle vehicle software development and over-the-air updates, and sell vehicles directly to consumers or through a hybrid direct-and-dealer network. Magna Steyr would manufacture the physical vehicles under contract, with Fisker paying a per-vehicle production cost and Magna bearing the fixed costs of the factory infrastructure. The gross margin on each vehicle sold would be the difference between the selling price and the combined cost of materials, the Magna manufacturing fee, and the costs of the software and customer-facing operations that Fisker itself operated. This model had precedents in other industries — Apple's asset-light manufacturing model, in which Foxconn and other contract manufacturers produce iPhones while Apple handles design and the customer relationship, is the most frequently cited analogy — but the automotive industry has characteristics that make the analogy imperfect. Vehicle manufacturing involves a physical complexity and safety criticality that consumer electronics manufacturing does not. The integration of mechanical systems, electronics, software, and structural components in a vehicle creates interdependencies where quality problems in any layer can cascade into safety issues or customer experience failures. Resolving these issues typically requires close collaboration between the design team and the production team — a collaboration that is most effective when both functions are within the same organizational structure. The subscription services model was a planned revenue stream that would have provided recurring income alongside vehicle sales. Fisker had announced plans for a flexible vehicle subscription service — allowing customers to access an Ocean without a traditional purchase or lease commitment — that would have generated monthly revenue and potentially reduced the barrier to adoption for consumers uncertain about making a large electric vehicle purchase. This model was inspired by the subscription services that software companies use to generate predictable recurring revenue, applied to a hardware product. In practice, the subscription service never reached significant scale before the bankruptcy filing. The direct-to-consumer sales model — bypassing traditional automotive dealer networks in favor of online ordering and company-operated delivery centers — was both a cost structure choice and a brand positioning decision. Traditional dealer networks require the manufacturer to offer margin support, warranty reimbursement, and marketing co-op funds that add cost to each vehicle sold. Direct sales eliminate this cost layer but require the manufacturer to invest in the customer-facing infrastructure that dealers would otherwise provide — showrooms, service centers, delivery logistics, and customer support. Fisker built some direct sales infrastructure but also ultimately pursued arrangements with third-party dealers in some markets, reflecting the practical reality that direct-only automotive retail at scale requires more infrastructure investment than the company had funded.