Fisker raised approximately $1.5 billion through the SPAC merger and subsequent equity offerings — a figure that appeared large for a technology startup but was wholly inadequate for the capital requirements of bringing a new vehicle platform to production quality standards. Rivian raised over $10 billion and Lucid raised approximately $5 billion before achieving sustainable production; Fisker's capital reserves left essentially no margin for the inevitable development challenges that new vehicle programs encounter.

Fisker commenced customer deliveries of the Ocean before the vehicle's software platform had achieved the quality and reliability standards that modern customers expect. The decision to begin deliveries with known software issues — apparently motivated by cash flow and production milestone pressures — damaged the brand with its most important early adopter customer segment and generated media coverage that was disproportionately negative relative to what a delayed launch with a polished product would have produced.

Fisker's decision to negotiate a large sale of Ocean vehicles to a rental car company at significantly discounted prices — in an attempt to move inventory and generate cash — damaged the brand's premium positioning and compressed residual values for existing Ocean owners, generating backlash from reservation holders and customer community members who had paid full retail prices.

The Ocean was Fisker's sole production vehicle, meaning that the company's entire revenue and cash flow depended on a single model achieving the sales volumes projected in business plans developed during a more optimistic EV market environment. The absence of a second production model left the company with no ability to redirect resources toward a product with better market reception when the Ocean underperformed.